Trust or control? Private development cooperation at the crossroads by Elbers, W.J. et al.






The following full text is a postprint version which may differ from the publisher's version.
 
 









Trust or control? Private development cooperation at the 
crossroads 
 
Willem Elbers, Luuk Knippenberg and Lau Schulpen 
 
Accepted by Public Administration and Development (13-9-13)  
 
Summary 
Development NGOs are increasingly adopting so-called managerial working 
methods. This paper explores the changing belief systems and practices of Northern 
development NGOs as well as the strains arising from this pressure. We draw upon a 
literature review and case studies of two Northern development NGOs and their 
Southern counterparts in Ghana, India and Nicaragua. Our findings show that 
managerialist ideas and practices clash with a number of values, views and goals 
that ‘traditionally’ have been widely shared in the private aid channel. To ensure that 
their actual practices remain consistent with their belief systems, Northern 
development NGOs cannot avoid making tough choices that will have key 
consequences for their future relevance and identity. 
 




In the 1980s, a set of values and visions about development emerged that came to 
be widely shared and adopted by a group of Northern development NGOs (NNGOs) 
(Tvedt, 2002: 369).1 Bottom up approaches, grassroots perspectives, gender 
equality, empowerment and participation were key principles while the root causes of 
poverty were attributed to unequal power relations. Development was primarily seen 
in terms of social and political transformation through empowerment at the individual, 
household and societal level (Mitlin et al., 2007; Lewis and Kanji, 2009: 56-60; 
Korten, 1990). Within this so-called social transformation approach, NNGOs saw 
themselves as catalysts for social change in the South and emphasized the 
importance of empowerment strategies and the need to support organizations linked 
to democratic movements (Biekart, 1999: 72). Values such as trust, equality and 
respect emerged as the defining principles of the relationships between NNGOs and 
their Southern allies (Fowler, 2000; Lister, 2000; Johnson and Wilson, 2006). There 
was broad political and societal consensus about the necessity of (private) 
development co-operation and the need for international solidarity. 
In the 1990s a new approach to development entered the private aid channel 
that revolved around a particular kind of management based on ‘scientific’ principles, 
technical problem solving and the application of rational tools for planning and 
measurement (Lewis, 2008: 46). It was the start of a period of so-called development 
managerialism, i.e. the adoption of the idea that improved management is the best 
way to overcome the limitations of previous approaches to development cooperation 
(Dar and Cooke, 2008; Mowles, 2007: 409; Dichter, 1999).  Effectiveness, efficiency 
and transparency became key principles, backed up by practices like independent 
financial auditing, strategic planning, logical framework analysis, risk management 
and quantitative impact-evaluations (Wallace et al., 2006: 164; Roberts et al., 2005; 
Mawdsley et al., 2002). 
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Both internal NGO-dynamics and changing back donor requirements account 
for the rise of managerialism within the private aid channel. Regarding the first, since 
the 1990s there has been a wide felt need among NNGOs to professionalize and pay 
more attention to the management aspects of their work (Edwards and Fowler, 
2002). While many NNGOs began as small and informal organizations, they became 
increasingly aware of the need to scale up their activities and become involved in 
more complex, multi-dimensional programmes (Lewis, 2008: 46-48). As NNGOs 
grew in scale and ambition, many started to recognize the limitations of their 
effectiveness and begun to examine management and organization issues in more 
depth. During the 1990s many NNGOs began implementing systems for strategic 
planning and formalize their internal systems and procedures (Lewis, 2006). 
The rise of managerialism in the private aid channel can also be traced to the 
increasingly demanding funding requirements of back donors. In the late 1980s 
OECD-governments started to become more critical regarding the effectiveness and 
efficiency of those receiving subsidies (Hood, 1991; Osborne and Gabler, 1992). One 
consequence has been that governmental donors, who traditionally have been a 
major source of funding for NNGOs, increasingly adopted managerialist-inspired 
funding conditions in the areas of reporting and accountability (Mawdsley et al., 2005; 
Wallace et al., 2006; Roberts et al, 2005). For NNGOs adopting managerialist 
working practices more and more became a precondition to qualify for governmental 
funding (Lewis 2008: 49).  
While the adoption of these managerialist practices can be seen as a means 
to improve performance and restore public and political support for (private) 
development cooperation, it increasingly attracted criticism for being at odds with the 
social transformation approach. Several critics have argued that the idea of 
development based on local participation, equality and ownership is not compatible 
with rigorous top down ‘rational’ planning, monitoring and evaluation (Bornstein, 
2003; Wallace et al., 2006). Others fear that NNGOs are losing their ability to 
challenge ‘mainstream’ models, practices and ideas as they lose their independence 
due to the increasingly demanding criteria of their back donors (Bebbington et al, 
2008: 4; Mitlin et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2011: 637). Overall, there is a growing 
concern that NNGOs are abandoning their original mission, vision and values (Hailey, 
2000; Dichter, 1999: 54; Lewis and Kanji, 2009).  
In this paper we explore the consequences of the adoption of managerialist 
principles by NNGOs for their original belief systems and practices. We do this by 
examining (1) the extent in which the belief systems and practices of NNGOs are 
changing due to the diffusion of managerialist ideas and methods; (2) the possibility 
of an irreconcilable conflict between managerialist ideas and practices on the one 
hand, and the goals, values and assumptions related to the social transformation 
approach on the other hand. The paper makes two contributions to the literature. 
First, it constructs ideal-types of two competing institutional logics (sets of widely 
shared values, beliefs and practices) that currently co-exist in the private aid channel. 
Based on the ideal-types, it identifies six areas where tensions between 
managerialism and the social transformation approach may manifest themselves. 
Second, the paper demonstrates that Northern development NGOs run the risk of 
organizational splits as they are trying to combine conflicting values, beliefs and 
practices. Overall, we want to contribute to the ongoing academic discussion on 
development managerialism (Dar and Cooke, 2008; McCourt and Gulrajani, 2010), 
and uphold a critical mirror to NNGOs wishing to reflect upon their current practices.  
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Our analysis is based upon a literature review and case studies of two 
NNGOs. We start our article by expounding our theoretical framework, which focuses 
on the concept of ‘institutional logic’. Then, we address our research questions in 
three steps:  
1. We typify, by means of so-called ideal types, the main characteristics of the 
social transformation approach and the managerialist approach to 
development. 
2. We apply these ideal types to the current belief systems and practices of 
Christian Aid (CA) and Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation 
(ICCO).  
3. We explore the compatibility of the beliefs and practices of the two 
approaches.  
The paper concludes with a summary of the main findings and their implications for 
NNGOs’ (added) value, future relevance and identity. 
 
2. Institutional logics and institutional change 
In this paper we draw upon the concept of ‘institutional logic’. This concept, derived 
from organizational institutionalism, starts from the premise that organizations are 
influenced by their institutional context, i.e. by collectively shared belief systems that 
define and delimit what is appropriate and meaningful behavior (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). The concept of institutional logic has 
proven successful for understanding how the introduction of a ‘managerial’ logic has 
transformed such fields as healthcare (Kitchener, 2002; Scott et al., 2000; Reay and 
Hinings, 2005, 2009), university education (Townley, 1997) and federal and state 
administration (Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006). In our paper, we use the concept 
to examine how ideas and practices in the private aid channel are changing due to 
adoption of a managerial logic. 
Institutional logics are organizing principles that guide the behaviour of 
organizations grouped around a set of issues central to their interests and objectives 
(Hoffman, 1999: 352). Such a group of organizations, in the aggregate referred to as 
an organizational field, share a common meaning system and interact more 
frequently with one another than with actors outside the field (Scott, 2008; Friedland 
and Alford, 1991). Institutional logics create a sense of common purpose and unity 
within an organizational field and consist of (1) belief systems and (2) associated 
practices. Belief systems define what goals or values are to be pursued within an 
organizational field and what the underlying assumptions are. Associated practices 
are the actual decisions that organizations make and the actions they undertake to 
pursue their goals and values (Reay and Hinings, 2005: 354; Thornton and Ocasio, 
1999: 804). In this paper, we analyze the belief systems and associated practices of 
the private aid channel, which is an organizational field consisting of development 
NGOs in the North and South and their back donors (Tvedt, 1998; 2002; 2006).2 We 
limit our analysis to those aspects associated with the relation between NNGOs and 
their Southern counterparts as this has been identified as key to the distinctiveness, 
credibility and quality of private development cooperation (Fowler, 1998; Ashman, 
2001; Edwards and Fowler, 2002).  
Organizational actors draw upon institutional logics for guidance, meaning and 
legitimacy. They offer the implicit rules which provide organizations with collective 
identities, motives and vocabularies, instill values, determine which problems get 
attended to, which solutions get considered, what outcomes are to be achieved, what 
practices are considered appropriate in particular circumstances and what suitable 
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types of relationships are between and within organizations (Townley, 1997: 263; 
Thornton and Ocasio, 2008: 111-114; Greenwood et al., 2002: 59). Both as a 
medium and an outcome of the behaviour they regulate (Giddens, 1984), institutional 
logics mature and solidify over time into specified roles, behaviours and interaction-
patterns between organizations. These are often reinforced by regulatory processes 
involving governmental agencies and professional bodies, which normatively and/or 
coercively press conformity upon organizations that are part of a specific field 
(Greenwood et al., 2002: 59). The practices of development NGOs, for example, are 
profoundly shaped (and standardized) by the (funding) requirements of ‘official’ 
donors (Wallace, 1997; Tvedt, 2006). 
Institutional logics are not static, however, but evolve over time in response to 
specific circumstances or more general societal changes in political and economic 
values and beliefs (Reay and Hinings, 2005: 354). Most institutional researchers 
perceive institutional change as a transition from one dominant logic to another 
(Greenwood et al., 2002; Hoffman, 1999). The introduction of a new dominant logic 
can create enormous ambiguity in a given organizational field as actors struggle to 
reconcile conflicting belief systems and practices. Conflicting logics co-exist during 
transition times until one side or the other wins and the field reforms around the 
winning dominant logic, or a new logic emerges that is a hybrid version of the two 
previous logics (Reay and Hinings, 2009: 631). From this perspective, our paper 
analyzes the shift in the private aid channel from the social transformation logic to the 
managerial logic, and questions whether and to what extent the social transformation 
logic is compatible with the managerial logic. 
 
3. Social transformation and managerial: comparing institutional logics   
In order to identify the main differences between the social transformation and 
managerial logics, we construct ideal types based on a review of the literature. Note 
that these ideal-types only intend to cover those NNGOs that have traditionally 
placed emphasis on addressing the root causes of poverty and social transformation. 
It is also important to recognize that ideal types are analytical constructs meaning 
they do not exist in pure form in reality. Finally, despite the many similarities that exist 
between the beliefs and practices of NNGOs, there are obviously also differences. To 
a certain extent, however, reducing complexity and diversity for the sake of 
pinpointing key characteristics is inherent to constructing ideal types.  
Table 1 below summarizes and contrasts the key characteristics of the two 




Table 1. Comparison of institutional logics 
 Social transformation Managerial 
Beliefs Development  development is a political process to 
change unequal power relations  
 development requires local ownership 
by marginalized groups 
 development can be planned and 
measured  
 development requires the ‘right’ set of 
management tools  
Civil society  civil society needs to be autonomous 
to contribute to development  
 civil society’s value is expressed in 
terms of its ability to act against vested 
interests  
 civil society is complementary to the state 
and  donors in achieving development  
 civil society’s value is expressed in terms 
of value for money  
Relationships   relations with local organizations are 
both a means and an end 
 value-based relations ensure local 
organizational autonomy 
 relations with local organizations are a 
means to an end 
 formalized relations prevent misuse of 
funds and ensure compliance with agreed 
upon results  
Practices Roles   NNGOs provide financial,  institutional 
and moral support  
 local organizations take the lead in 
development work 
 NNGOs ensure value for money 
 local organizations implement 
contractually specified activities and 
comply with accountability requirements 
Selection  local organizations have to be locally 
rooted to qualify for a relationship 
 local organizations have to be strong and 
professional to qualify for funding 
Governance  NNGOs refrain from interfering in 
development interventions and internal 
affairs 
 NNGOs control how funds are spend and 
what accountability requirements  are met 
Source: own analysis based on a literature review 
 
Social transformation 
The social transformation logic sees development (cooperation) as a political 
process, aimed at changing unequal power relations. Poverty is not inevitable or 
‘natural’, but a result of human-made social, economic and political structures 
favoring certain people at the expense of others. Development is viewed as a 
process in which these structures are transformed and marginalized people are 
empowered (Lewis and Kanji, 2009). Emphasizing power implies an inherently 
political perspective on development (cooperation) (Macdonald, 1994: 283; Wallace 
et al., 2006: 43). While development cooperation can facilitate social transformation, 
the latter is thought to be an indigenous process. More specifically, it is believed that 
empowerment of marginalized groups can only be ensured when it is locally owned 
and driven (Pearce, 1993: 226; Wallace et al., 2006: 31). 
An autonomous civil society is considered essential for development. Civil 
society is viewed as a realm, outside those of government and business, where 
social movements and change-oriented NGOs can speak up for marginalized people 
(Bebbington et al, 2008: 3; Howell and Pearce 2002: 36 ). The social transformation 
logic is generally skeptical about the willingness and ability of official development aid 
to leverage deep changes in formal structures that perpetuate marginalization 
(Fisher, 1997: 445; Mitlin et al, 2007: 1704). Civil society’s strength is seen to lie 
primarily in its in ability to get issues on the agenda or address problems that 
governments and official donors are unwilling or unable to tackle. Autonomy from the 
state and donors is therefore perceived as a pre-condition for civil society to make a 
meaningful contribution to development (Howell and Pearce 2002: 37). 
 The consolidation of equal relationships between NNGOs and their Southern 
counterparts is seen as both a means and an end in itself. Such relations are 
essential for achieving locally owned change (Clinton, 1991: 62; Brehm, 2004). 
Starting from the idea that local organizations have the best understanding of their 
own reality, interventions aimed at structural change have to be indigenous to be 
effective and sustainable. North-South relations - referred to as partnerships - are 
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also explicitly viewed as an expression of values such as trust, equality, mutuality 
and mutual respect (Fowler, 2000: 4; Lister, 2000; Elbers and Schulpen, 2010). 
These values reflect an ideological aspiration of international solidarity and a shared 
desire to challenge injustice (Fowler, 1998; Murphy, 2000: 343-346). The value-base 
underlying partnership is also thought to be essential for ensuring the autonomy of 
local partners. In particular, trust is seen as a pre-condition for enabling local 
organizations to determine their own strategic direction (Mawdsley et al., 2002). 
 In terms of the actual practices, the social transformation logic discerns 
specific roles for NNGOs and their Southern counterparts. Given the emphasis on 
local ownership and organizational autonomy, local organizations play the lead role 
in designing activities and doing the actual work ‘on the ground’. Northern aid 
agencies’ involvement is primarily defined in terms of facilitation meaning that they 
should refrain from direct involvement in implementation (Lewis, 1998). Their role is 
to provide financial, institutional and moral support enabling their partner 
organizations to take the lead (Eade, 2007). This requires long-term relations, flexible 
funding arrangements, capacity building and (financial) solidarity in times of difficulty 
(Brehm, 2004: 24; Hoksbergen, 2005: 18). 
NNGOs are supposed to work with ‘native’ local organizations as they are 
locally rooted and enjoy greater legitimacy than those set up by overseas donors 
(Hoksbergen, 2005: 22-23). To ensure local partners’ autonomy, Northern aid 
agencies have to minimize the power distortion arising from the transfer of resources 
(Brehm, 2004; Fowler, 1998). They are thus to refrain from interference in their 
partners’ internal affairs and operations (Harrison, 2007; Clinton, 1991: 63-64). 
Overall, local partners are to have a considerable degree of discretion over the use of 
funds while accountability is mutual (Hudock, 1999). 
 
Managerialism 
The managerialist logic emphasizes the importance of realizing predictable and 
measurable results. Much importance is attached to the use of management tools in 
areas such as financial management, risk assessment, planning, monitoring and 
evaluation (Roberts et al., 2005: 1853). Especially the measurement of results is 
perceived to be crucial for enabling better tracking of implementation, enhanced 
accountability and tangible results (Bornstein, 2006).  
A central idea is that it is possible to establish causal relations between interventions 
and results, reflecting a linear perspective of development processes. Overall, the 
use of management tools is implicitly considered to be a rational exercise based on 
scientific principles (Mowles, 2010: 152; Gulrajani, 2011: 206).  
Civil society fulfils an important function in the managerial logic by 
complementing the development efforts of the state and donors. The underlying idea 
is that state, market and civil society are working towards a common global cause 
(Murphy, 2008: 18; Mowles, 2010: 156; White, 1999: 308). The managerial logic 
holds an instrumental perspective regarding civil society. Local civil society 
organizations are seen as flexible agents of service delivery (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: 
43) who can contribute to donor objectives. As such, their value is seen to lie in the 
results they achieve, or put differently, in the value for money they offer (Thomas, 
2008: 101).  
Relationships with local organizations are seen as fee-for-service exchanges 
that serve to achieve tangible development outcomes. They enable NNGOs to 
access crucial resources such as technical expertise, on-the-ground contacts and an 
understanding of the local context. The managerial logic emphasizes the risks that 
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too much faith in the goodwill or capabilities of the partner can bring about, as local 
organizations may engage in erroneous or fraudulent activities. Strict accountability 
measures are therefore considered necessary to ensure transparency and the proper 
use of funds. Contracts clarify and formalize agreements, provide clear prescriptions 
of conduct and outline sanctions and incentives to ensure compliance (Roberts et al., 
2005: 1851; Power, 1999: 124). 
The goals, values and underlying assumptions of the managerial logic are 
clearly reflected in its actual practices. Local organizations are viewed as 
implementers of contractually specified activities. They are hired for a definite time 
period to implement a specific activity and realize pre-defined and measurable 
outcomes. In principle there is no expectation by either party that the relationship will 
extend beyond the term of the contract (Leach, 1995). NNGOs’ main role is to 
purchase services from local organizations, ensure value for money and monitor 
performance.  
To qualify for funding, local organizations need to be professional and 
capable. Such organizations are able to work with management tools, have a formal 
mission and vision, keep standardized accounts, comply with national (tax) laws and 
undergo periodical independent financial audits (Roberts et al., 2005: 1851-52). 
Selection of local organizations takes place through competitive tendering in which 
applications are ranked by score (Wallace et al., 2006: 62-65). As local organizations 
are hired to implement contractually specified activities, key decisions are made by 
NNGOs. This means that the activities that qualify for funding, reporting requirements 
and methodologies used for outcome measurement are specified in detail in advance 
(Leach, 1995).  
  
4. Institutional logics in practice: the cases of Christian Aid and ICCO  
This section empirically examines the degree to which NNGOs have shifted from the 
social transformation to the managerial logic on the basis of the key characteristics 
outlined in table 1. Our analysis is based on two cases: Christian Aid (CA) and 
Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO).   
Since the early 1980s, both NNGOs are well known in their countries of origin 
(UK and Netherlands) for being what Donini et al. (2008) refer to as ‘solidarists’: 
NNGOs that place a strong emphasis on addressing the root causes of poverty and 
social transformation. Their longstanding solidarist tradition improves the likelihood of 
them sticking to their ‘original’ principles. CA and ICCO thus represent excellent 
cases for assessing the degree to which the managerial logic has penetrated the 
private aid channel. The focus of the analysis is on those beliefs, values and 
practices that are widely shared within both agencies. 
 The research for this paper was primarily conducted during a period of eight 
months in 2008 by means of semi-structured interviews and the gathering of  relevant 
documents (e.g. policy papers, strategic plans and contracts). A limited number of 
(follow up) interviews were also conducted in 2009 and 2010. To establish whether 
the adoption of managerialist ideas and practices differed between countries, 
fieldwork was conducted in Ghana and India and Nicaragua. In total 64 interviews 
were conducted consisting of 25 ICCO-partners, 22 CA partners, nine staff of ICCO 
and eight of CA. Partner representatives interviewed were those responsible for 
managing the relations with donor agencies, usually the managing director or 
equivalent. Interviewed agency-staff consisted primarily of those managing the 
relations with the interviewed partners. To ensure a diversified sample, partners were 
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selected on the basis of their thematic focus, size in terms of budget and staff, 
geographical location and the length of the relationship.  
 During the interviews various aspects of the relation were explored including 
the importance attached to (the principles of) partnership, the development of the 
relationship over time, funding requirements, power asymmetries and accountability. 
To ensure as much as possible that respondents did not withhold (sensitive) 
information, they were granted confidentiality. Agency-staff who demonstrated 
particular interest in the study during the interviews were invited to provide feedback 
on a draft of the paper. While the paper benefited from the feedback through 
numerous (small) improvements, it did not result in any major changes. 
 
Belief systems 
At the level of belief system, interviews with agency-staff and a review of the 
agencies’ policy papers revealed the language and thinking of the social 
transformation logic while the managerialist logic appeared to be absent. In 
explaining the mission and vision of their organization, staff of ICCO and CA both 
emphasized that the world is characterized by enormous wealth existing alongside 
extreme poverty. Therefore “much of today’s poverty is ultimately the result of 
exclusion and inequality” (Interview PO CA, 5 May 2008). This line of reasoning is 
clearly reflected in the agencies’ policy papers. CA’s strategic policy paper, for 
example, concludes that “poverty is a condition created by an unjust society, denying 
people access to, and control over, the resources they need to live a full life’ (CA, 
2005: 4). Similarly, ICCO emphasizes that “poverty is not a natural phenomenon, but 
the result of human intervention” (ICCO, 2007: 17). In emphasizing the political 
nature of poverty, both agencies view development as a struggle “to challenge and 
change the systems which favor the rich and powerful over the poor and 
marginalized” (CA, 2008: 1) towards “a change in economic, social and political 
power structures” (ICCO, 2007: 17). This however, is only possible when “the people 
themselves own the development process, they have to be in the driver’s seat” 
(interview PO ICCO, 1 July 2008). 
In line with the social transformation logic, (staff of) ICCO and CA identify a 
strong and autonomous civil society to be at the core of social transformation. Civil 
society organizations are perceived as being in the best position to understand and 
represent the interests of marginalized people. Moreover, the agencies view society 
organizations has having to play a major role in addressing the structures that keep 
people poor (CA, 2004b: 1; ICCO, 2007: 16). To ensure that change is locally owned 
“civil society must operate autonomously. […] To us Southern civil society actors are 
not instruments for aid delivery but actors in their own right” (interview PO CA, 5 May, 
2008). Given the importance attached to a strong and autonomous civil society, both 
agencies regard the capacity building of partners integral to their approach (ICCO, 
2003: 5; CA, 2004b: 1). 
Finally, the agencies’ views on their relationships with local counterparts 
appeared to resonate with the social transformation logic. Both agencies view 
partnership as central to their development approach (ICCO, 2003: 5; CA 2004: 3). 
“Without partners we cannot do our work. […] But I would also say that partnership is 
part of our identity as an organization” (interview PO ICCO, 1 February, 2008). ICCO 
and CA identify key values such as solidarity, equality, mutual respect, mutuality and 
trust as the foundation of their partnerships (ICCO, 2003: 5; CA, 2004a: 5). They also 
realize that equal relations are far from easy to achieve in practice: “Because we 
control the money, power imbalances are inevitable. Therefore we try to take steps to 
9 
 
offset these imbalances as much as possible” (interview PO CA, 5 May, 2008).  
Consequently, both agencies aim to be flexible in terms of the operational space they 
give to partners while allowing them to determine their own strategic direction (CA, 
2004a: 5; ICCO, 2003: 8). 
  
Practices 
At first sight, the practices of ICCO and CA also seem to match the social 
transformation logic. Partners take the lead in project-design and implementation 
while both agencies provide the pre-conditions that allow their partners to do their 
work. Project-Officers (POs) of ICCO and CA may give “feedback, share ideas or 
help out when there are problems but in the end they [partners] have to make it 
happen” (Interview PO CA, 5 May 2008). The importance attached to building a 
strong and autonomous civil society authorizes POs to spend considerable time and 
resources on their partners’ capacity building. Other forms of support include the 
funding of core costs, long-term funding commitments and maintaining support when 
other funders withdraw.  
At the same time, the managerial logic is also clearly present in the actual 
division of roles in the partnerships of ICCO and CA. POs explained that expectations 
towards partners in terms of demonstrating results and accountability have increased 
over the years while the management information systems of both agencies have 
become more demanding. There has been a shift from input-based towards 
outcome-based reporting and there is increasing emphasis on ’correct’ handling of 
funds. As a PO of ICCO explains, “we really need the reports and audits, because we 
are audited ourselves. If we don’t receive them on time, we get problems with our 
own auditor” (interview 1 July 2008). Consequently, agency-tasks increasingly 
revolve around assessing risk, monitoring performance and ensuring that reports 
sufficiently address agreed upon results. Similarly, satisfying accountability 
requirements has become a more explicit role for partners. Agency-staff pointed out, 
however, that it is becoming more difficult to uphold wholly trust-based relations: “[for 
ICCO] trust has always been the starting-point of the relation. The new 
[accountability] systems that we have in place, however, increasingly force us to act 
like policemen” (Interview PO ICCO, 17 February 2008). 
Looking at criteria for selecting partners, table 2 shows both logics to be 
present, although managerialism manifests itself more prominently. The social 
transformation logic is reflected in the agencies preference for organizations that are 
locally rooted. Their main criteria to select a ‘suitable’ partner, however, are 
becoming programmatic focus and organizational capacity, although, for ICCO and 
CA the use of programmatic criteria – a manifestation of the managerialist emphasis 
on targeting - still remains a relatively new practice. Until the early 2000s, neither of 
the two agencies had an explicit programmatic focus. It was only after ICCO and CA 
adopted strategic planning that they started to formulate explicit policy goals and 


























Both agencies recently made their procedures for assessing organizational capacity 
more systematic and refined. To assess the capacity of potential partners they use 
several (largely similar) criteria that relate to track record, financial position and 
management, planning, monitoring and evaluation systems and organizational 
structure and governance. These criteria reflects prevailing ‘professional’ standards 
in such fields as finances (standard account keeping, independent financial auditing), 
planning (use of logical framework, strategic plans) and governance (formalized 
operating principles and procedures). POs explained that the increasing emphasis on 
assessing organizational capacity should be seen in the context of the growing 
emphasis on tangible results and accountability, with the agencies themselves being 
judged on their ‘business plan’ and passing on requirements to their partners. One 
consequence of “this focus on delivering results” has been “that ICCO has come to 
favor large and established organizations” (interview PO ICCO, 7-1-08).  
In the area of governance, the social transformation logic still is clearly 
reflected in the agencies’ practices. Regarding project-design and implementation, 
partners can pursue their own preferences when designing and implementing 
projects provided that they meet the agencies’ programmatic requirements. When it 
comes to capacity building, partners of ICCO and CA repeatedly emphasized the 
flexibility of both agencies. In principle, support for organizational strengthening 
follows the partners’ own agenda and partners are stimulated to ask for institutional 
support. While partners are contractually obliged to submit periodical narrative and 
financial reports, they do not have to work with pre-defined formats.3 Instead – and 
this was confirmed by partners – the starting-point of both agencies is that reporting-
procedures and formats, wherever feasible, are adapted to the partners’ own internal 
planning, monitoring and evaluation-systems.  
 At the same time, however, elements of the managerial logic also become 
visible in the agencies’ governance practices. Project-contracts have become legally 
valid in recent years while containing explicit results-agreements including clear 
Table 2. Main partner selection criteria of ICCO and CA 
Criteria Indicators 
Local rootedness  Membership networks 
 Grassroots linkages 
 participation beneficiaries 
 Downwards accountability 
Identity  Shared (Christian) value-base 
 Compatible mission and vision 
Programmatic focus  Theme 
 Strategy 
 Target group 
 Geographical focus 
Track record 
 
 Past achievements 




 Income, liquidity and solvency 
 Accounting system   




 Strategic planning  





 Compliance with national laws 
 Formal mission and vision 
 Board presence and composition 
Source: policy documents and interviews with POs 
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targets and milestones to be achieved during different phases of the project-cycle. 
This offers the agencies better possibilities to mitigate risks in the case of serious 
mismanagement of funds and limits their liability in case of fraud. POs of both 
agencies did mention, however, that the focus on control had a limiting effect on their 
partners’ autonomy. This was confirmed by partner-organizations: “As the contracts 
have become stricter, more has come to depend on the willingness of your project-
officer whether you are allowed to deviate from the original project-plan when 
unexpected things happen (interview partner CA, 24 September 2008). 
 
5. The feasibility of hybridization 
Our analysis of ICCO and CA shows that the agencies’ belief systems still primarily follow 
the social transformation logic, while their associated practices have or tend to become 
hybrids, containing elements of the social transformation logic and managerial logics, 
with a growing accent on the latter. It also demonstrates that in their day-to-day practices, 
tensions manifest themselves between the two logics. Because the agencies thus far 
have only embraced some of the practices associated with the managerial logic, 
however, they are not yet forced to fundamentally revaluate the alignment between their 
belief systems and their actual practices. As both logics depart from different goals, 
values and assumptions, this raises the question whether a hybridization of the two logics 
is a sustainable option for NNGOs in the long run. Below we further explore the tensions 
that emerged from our empirical analysis on the basis of a literature review. Using table 1 
as our ‘analytical lens’, we identify at least six areas where tensions between the two 
logics may possibly manifest themselves.4 
First, the managerial emphasis on neutral policy and technical problem solving 
and management solutions appears to be conflicting with the view that development 
(cooperation) is inherently political. The latter implies that development is inseparably 
related to questions related to politics and justice. In contrast, the policy based, 
managerial logic, takes existing patterns of political and economic development as a 
given (Bebbington, 2005: 940; Hickey and Bracking, 2005: 855; Edwards, 2010). 
Critic would argue that this means that ‘questions about rights, entitlements, how one 
should live and who should decide, [are transformed] into technical questions of 
efficiency and sustainability’ (Mosse, 2005: 12). In a similar sense, the managerial 
logic takes the ideology on which the official aid system is based as a given and 
implicitly views donors and their partners as neutral actors engaged in a joint effort to 
combat poverty. Proponents of the social transformation logic would argue that this 
view incorrectly presents donors and their partners as though they have no political 
agenda, interests and ideological preferences of their own (Howell and Pearce, 2001: 
83; White, 1999; Bebbington, 2008). 
Second, the emphasis on predictability, control and measurement seems to 
clash with the nature of ‘political’ interventions. Rational planning tools start from the 
idea that a desired end-state can be planned in a value free manner following logical 
and causal steps (Mowles et al., 2008: 806). This kind of planning and the thinking 
underlying it, however, is less suitable to handle interventions that are discordant by 
nature, unpredictable, process-oriented or difficult to measure. These characteristics, 
however, are typically those of interventions seeking to change power relations 
(Bornstein, 2006: 53; Wallace et al., 2006). Consequently, the requirements of 
rational planning tools run the risk of confining the scope of interventions to precisely 




Third, the view that civil society should serve the goals of official aid clashes 
with the idea that autonomy is central to its significance. While the managerial logic 
views civil society organizations as instruments for achieving donor objectives, the 
social transformation logic perceives civil society’s strength to lie in its in ability to 
engage issues their states or official donors do not address. From the perspective of 
the latter, having to work within the policy frameworks of the state and official donors 
is therefore seen as eroding the potential of civil society to contribute to development, 
on its own terms (Mitlin et al., 2007: 1709; Smillie, 1995: 179). 
Fourth, the viewpoint that North-South relations are fee-for-service exchanges 
is in contrast with the idea that these relations are more than a mean towards a 
predefined goal; they are an end in themselves, with an intrinsic value. To 
proponents of the social transformation logic, the value-base underlying partnership 
matters. NNGOs are seen to be part of a global movement of citizens seeking to 
support marginalized people in their fight against injustice (Murphy, 2000: 344-345). 
North-South relations reflect the notion of international solidarity: the idea that people 
from different parts of the world cooperate for a common cause, against a shared 
problem, and not as such for a common solution, if only because of the context-
specificity and political nature of most solutions. From this perspective, development 
cooperation is neither about fighting somebody else’s battle nor about pity or charity. 
This contrasts with the managerial logic which does not recognize the intrinsic value 
of North-South relations, and is inclined to favour policy based solutions. In particular, 
the emphasis on reciprocal trust it is difficult to reconcile with the managerial 
emphasis on strict accountability measures. 
Fifth, the emphasis on control seems to conflict with the idea that local 
ownership is a precondition for effective and sustainable development (cooperation). 
Under the managerial logic donor-objectives form the starting-point of policy 
interventions (Leach, 1995). For proponents of the social transformation logic, this 
approach contradicts the idea that development is an indigenous process, and 
therefore by definition not neutral or prescriptive, that development cooperation is 
about enabling people to find their own solutions, on their own conditions, to their 
own problems (Howell and Pearce 2001: 37).  
Sixth, the preference for strong and capable organizations, defined in terms of 
being able to meet managerialist requirements, may clash with the importance 
attached to organizations’ local rootedness. Specific knowledge and expertise is 
required to prepare and write reports and proposals, manage large sums of money, 
provide detailed records of expenses, carry out or organise monitoring and 
evaluations and stay tuned to international aid flows and trends education (Markowitz 
& Tice 2002: 950; Roberts et al., 2005: 1850). Precisely those organisations that tend 
to have strong grassroots connections, such as smaller NGO’s, grassroots 
organisations and social movements, may lack the capacity to satisfy these 
requirements (Gideon, 1998: 317). In other words,  the managerial logic runs the risk 




This paper examined (1) how the belief systems and practices of NNGOs are 
changing due to the diffusion of managerialist ideas and methods; (2) whether the 
managerialist approach is compatible with a number of widely shared goals, values 
and assumptions related to social transformation and. To answer these questions, we 
reconstructed ideal-types of the ‘old’ social transformation logic and the ‘new’ 
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managerial logic. Our analysis showed that the introduction of the managerial logic 
contains a set of goals, values and assumptions that represents a fundamentally 
different perspective about development (cooperation), the role and value of civil 
society, the governance of North-South relations and the required characteristics of 
local organizations. Our analysis of Christian Aid and ICCO demonstrated that these 
agencies have so far remained largely ‘loyal’ to their original belief systems, although 
political and societal pressures have forced them to adopt a range of managerial 
practices. As the agencies had only adopted some of the practices associated with 
the managerial logic, they were not yet forced to fundamentally revaluate the 
alignment between their belief systems and their actual practices.  
With continuing societal and political pressure to deliver tangible results, the 
need for such a revaluation at some point seems inevitable. We identify at least six 
areas in which the goals, values and assumptions of the social transformation logic 
potentially clash with those of the managerial logic. This makes it questionable 
whether the two logics can truly be merged, into a combined approach that 
strengthens or even upholds the best aspects of both approaches. This is a relevant 
finding because the pressures for accountability. i.e. the core aspects of managerial 
logic, are more likely to prevail and increase, than to decrease in the near future. 
NNGOs run the risk of organizational schizophrenia, the more so if they continue to 
embrace managerialist practices while sticking to their ‘solidarist’ beliefs.  
These findings do not mean that NNGOs should bluntly reject from 
managerialist practices. They do imply, however, that NNGOs should be aware of the 
difficulties and sometimes even impossibilities that emerge from combining the 
managerialist and social transformation logics in their daily practice. The main 
challenge for NNGOs is to clarify where they stand in terms of the kind of change 
they want to bring about and their underlying values and assumptions. Only by 
making their own position explicit it becomes possible for them to see where they 
(want to) stand in relation to the goals, values and assumption of the social 
transformation and managerial logics. 
 The contradictions between both logics will increasingly challenge and even 
force NNGOs to make choices about their future direction. We envision two basic 
future directions, although variants are certainly possible. One direction represents a 
future in which NNGOs increasingly come to rely on managerialist principles and the 
maximization of effectiveness and efficiency to generate value. While it is an 
attractive direction in the sense that it allows NNGOs to continue to draw upon 
governmental funding sources, it also implies reduced autonomy from official donors 
and the risk of becoming increasingly interchangeable with governmental and 
business actors. Another direction stands for a future in which NNGOs raison d'être 
is based on civic values and a more politicized role in development. While this 
direction implies reduced access to official funding with consequences for their 
current status in terms of income, staffing and size, it offers more organizational 
autonomy, distinctiveness from governmental and business actors and (added) value 
that goes beyond effectiveness and efficiency. Whatever they decide to do, NNGOs 
stand at a crossroads and the choices they make will have key consequences for 
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1
 Northern development NGOs are independent actors that exist apart from governments and 
businesses, originate from Northern countries, operate on a non-profit basis and pursue a mandate of 
promoting development in Southern countries on the basis of a set of humanitarian values.  
2
 The actors in the private aid channel are structurally integrated due to resource transfers, a common 
meaning system and shared practices. Ideas and practices are diffused through several mechanisms 
including a continuous exchange of personnel between the channel’s main actors, the widespread use 
of consultants, funding conditions and international conferences (Tvedt, 1998). 
3
 POs emphasized that this flexibility is also something that partners have to ‘earn’. It is only granted to 
those partners that have gained POs’ trust and whose (past) reporting has been satisfactory. 
4
 As our analysis takes place at the level of logics, the contradictions we find are in the first instance 
theoretical. However, the more profoundly NNGOs embrace the managerial logic while continuing to stick 
to the goals, values and assumptions of the social transformation logic, the more these analytical 
contradictions are likely to become actual contradictions. 
 
